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SELFISHNESS : A PSYCHOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.
BY WILLIAM M. SALTER.
A SPECIOUS plea in behalf of human selfishness is
sometimes made on the ground that all human actions
are necessarily selfish. Aside from those cases in
which we are compelled against our will and which in
the "strict sense of the word are hardly actions at all,
it is held that all voluntary actions are done with a
view to cur own pleasure or happiness. It is even
said that we can no more help acting selfishly than we
can help breathing ; that when we seem to be inter-
ested in the welfare of another, it is because the other
contributes to our happiness ; that we deceive ourselves
in thinking we can act for the happiness of anybody
but ourselves ; that if for example we give a quarter
to a poor man on the street it is not for his benefit but
for our own, since if we refused we might have dis-
agreeable sensations afterwards.
What is the truth in this?—for I suppose it may
be taken for granted that any views honestly held by
intelligent persons must have some truth in them.
What is indisputable seems to me to be this—that we
never do anything voluntarily unless we choose or
prefer or please to do it. In fact, it is so clear that I
suspect it comes near being tautological. When we
speak of acting voluntarily, we f/iean acting according to
our will or pleasure. Now from this truth the inference
is drawn that we act /or our pleasure,— or, (since
pleasure and happiness are at bottom the same thing)
for our happiness. It appears thus to be a necessary
law of our being that all actions are interested, their
final end being in ourselves. Our own pleasure or
happiness seems to be the only thing that can move
the will to act ; if we care for others, it is only that
this is one way of getting pleasure for ourselves.
It must be admitted that there are considerable
authorities for this view. Leslie Stephen, one of the
first English writers on Ethics, says that "pain and
pleasure are the sole determining causes of action."*
A leading American sociologist, Lester F. Ward, de-
clares that all actions "agree in having pleasure for
their end," and that "benevolent and philanthropic
actions are prompted like others by the motive of di-
minishing disagreeable feelings experienced by those
who perform them. " * Bain holds that there are " only
two great classes of stimulants; either a pleasure or a
pain, present or remote, must lurk in every situation
that drives us into action, "f And Bentham asserted
that "every human being is led to pursue that line of
conduct which, according to his view of the case, taken
by him at the moment, will be in the highest degree
contributing to his own greatest happiness.
"J
None the less I ask, is it true that we always act
for our pleasure or happiness? To act /or a thing is
to act in view of it, is to act with it in mind, or to aim
at it. Is it true that we always have pleasure or
pleasures in mind when we are prompted to action?
I think it more nearly accords with our ordinary con-
sciousness and modes of speech to say that it is some-
times the case that we desire certain things or objects,
and while the getting them gives us pleasure, it is not
so much the pleasure as the things we want. This
seems to be true sometimes even of a desire like hun-
ger. The satisfying of hunger generally brings pleas-
ure, but it is not the pleasure the really hungry man
is thinking of, but the food— it seems a direct appetite
for an object. When we do think of \\if: pleasures of
eating, this is not so much the primary as a secondary
desire; and when a person thinks of almost nothing
else (being perhaps so well-fed that he never expe-
riences real hunger), we do not call him an excep-
tionally hungry man, but a gourmand. § The same
direct interest in an object sometimes shows itself in
the business world. I was struck a few years ago by
the language of the President of a bank that had
failed. He said with a kind of mournfulness, " I was
wedded to it always. To me my own pleasure was a
second thought to its prosperity." Any of my readers
can probably think of persons in these days of fever-
ish competition who are so wrapped up in business
pursuits that they scarcely think of themselves or their
pleasure—do not, as we may well say, think enough.
It is as if such persons put all that is commonly called
pleasure or enjoyment to one side and set but one aim
before them—that of making money. It is perfectly
true to say that this is their choice, their preference,
* Dynamic Sociology.
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their (in this sense) pleasure or happiness. But it
hardly has sense to add that they act as they do for
the sake of this pleasure, when all that is meant is that
they act as they choose and it would be as rational to
say that they act for the sake of their choice. In fact,
this brings home to us that there is an ambiguity in
the word pleasure and it is incumbent on us to trace
it out if we do not wish to be led astray by words.
Pleasure seems sometimes to indicate the mere fact
of preference or choice. To say "I please to do a
thing," or "it is my pleasure to do it," is the same as
saying "I choose to do it ; pleasure here means a state
of will. On the other hand, pleasure sometimes means
a sensation—as when we speak of the pleasures of
taste, the pleasures of exercise, the pleasures of study
or the pleasures of doing good ; we mean here the
agreeable feelings that follow any of these things, and
the idea and expectation of which may of course move
us to action. The two senses of the word point to
different psychological states. Yet since we have the
same word for them we glide from one to the other
without being clearly aware of the difference. When
we act as we please, or according to our pleasure, we
think it must be the same, when anyone tells us so,
as acting in view of our pleasure or for the sake of it
;
yet in the latter statement, we use the word pleasure
in one sense, (that of an agreeable feeling), and in the
former, we use it in another sense (that of preference
or choice). No one would say we act as we choose,
for the sake of our choice, and yet we delude ourselves
into thinking it is rational to say that we act as we
please for the sake of our pleasure. It is only rational
to make the latter statement, in case we understand
by "please" one thing 'and by "pleasure" a quite dis-
tinct thing. But the fact seems to be that we may act
according to our pleasure (in the sense of choice) and
yet for the sake of a hundred other things besides
pleasure (in the sense of agreeable feeling). I have
spoken of money-making ; but we may set before our-
selves V ictory in some sport, or a position of power over
others, or adding to the sum of knowledge in the world
or the creation of objects of beauty or the advancing of
social justice. For though from any of these objects
once attained, there would doubtless come pleasure to
us, yet we may scarcely think of the pleasure in the
time, being completely absorbed in the pursuit of the
objects themselves.
Let me take a very simple illustration. A boy
plays a game of ball ; he plays to beat—and he doubt-
less thinks at the outset how fine i. e. how pleasur-
able, it would be to beat. But he gets into the game,
he warms up, he tries to make every step and move-
ment count and to take advantage of every failure or
weakness of the other side—and what is he thinking
of now? Of the pleasurable emotions that will follow
victory ? Perhaps not at all, but simply of winning
the game. At any given moment, possibly not even
of this, but rather of getting the greatest number of
tallies for this inning, or even of simply reaching a
certain base ; and if, while he is running for the latter,
he allows himself to think of the pleasures of victory
or even looks ahead to the winning of the game, his
attention may be so divided as to hinder him from
reaching the base. The truth is that instead of the
pleasure of victory being the constant spring of his
action, it may be su in the iirst place and then not be
thought of again till the game is done. Can a person
be properly said to be acting /^r that which is not in
his mind—to be aiming at that which he is not think-
ing of? This would be self contradictory.
After all, is it not so familiar a truth that it is a
commonplace, that pleasures are surest to come when
we do not aim at them, that if we seek them we are
apt to lose them ? How does this comport with the
idea that we are always seeking our own happines and
always must? The fact is that it is because men do
not always seek it and sometimes forget it altogether,
that they get most of the happiness that they actually
possess. Without doubt benevolent individuals ex-
perience agreeable feelings after doing kindly acts ;
but it is possible that they experience them in an in-
verse ratio to the extent they have distinctly expected
or aimed at them. If we give a quarter to a poor man
with no other motive than that of experiencing self-
congratulation afterward, we run the risk of not ex-
periencing self- congratulation at all; and our feeling
may be instead, "What sophisticated fools we were
to expect it ! "
The facts compel us to go further. We may not
only forget our pleasure and happiness, but we may
voluntarily do things inconsistent with our pleasure or
happiness, taken as a whole. It is not true to our ex-
perience to say as Bentham does that we always act
for what at least at the moment we think will con-
tribute to our greatest happiness. It may possibly be
rational to do this, but in fact we sometimes do the
contrary. We may do things (for a present enjoy-
ment) that we know will be followed by more misery
than happiness ; a present craving may overrule the
rational thought of our greatest happiness ; we may
voluntarily let the latter go for the sake of the gratifi-
cation now. The appetite for drink may so rule us ;
we may be perfectly aware that for every moment of
pleasure (in drinking) we shall have in time twenty
moments of pain and none the less choose the present
pleasure. John Stuart Mill admitted that men some-
times " pursue sensual indulgences to the injury of
health, though perfectly aware that health is the
greater good."* Moreover, there is an experience of
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a different character in which we may act even against
present pleasure. A distinction of consciousness has
passed into common speech, namely, that between
choosing to do a thing from " a sense of duty" and so
choosing because we anticipate pleasure in so doing.
In the latter case, we may need only to think of a
thing to want to do it ; in the former, though reason
and conscience approve, it may be hard to make up our
mind. For example, one person finds pleasure in
walking, or riding on a horse ; the idea has only to
cross his mind at certain times to make him wish to
throw up his books or his business and go out ins
Freie. Another may recognise that the exercise would
be good for him, may feel that he ought to go, and yet
from absorption in his books or work, or perhaps
from physical laziness, may be averse to going.
Plainly these are different moods. Both may eventu-
ally choose to take the walk ; but one from anticipa-
tion of pleasure, the other from a sense of duty.
Sometimes the nobility of a thing, aside from duty,
may attract us and lead us to bear pain willingly for the
sake of achieving it. Mrs. Browning says, "If heads
that hold a rhythmic thought must ache perforce, then
I, for one, choose headaches."
This does not mean that headaches are ever agree-
able sensations or that by willing we can make them
so, but simply that we may choose them despite their
disagreeableness for the sake of a higher good. So
J. S. Mill somewhere says that the state of a discon-
tented Socrates is better than that of a contented pig
;
that is, in certain circumstances it is better to be un-
happy than happy. And there have been not a few
who have acted on this conviction. One feels in read-
ing some of the leaders of modern scientific thought,
Tyndall for instance, that the sacrifice of all things
false, however pleasant they maj' be, is for them a
paramount and primary duty. Romance and tragedy
are full of situtions in which the longing for personal
happiness goes down under the influence of a grander
motion. Adam Bade resigns in his own mind the girl
he loves because he sees his brother loves her and he
will not stand in his way. Enoch Arden comes back,
finds his wife married again and happy with her hus-
band and children, and goes off without revealing him-
self, rather than disturb their happiness. Fedalma,
in what seems to me George Eliot's masterpiece. The
Spanish Gypsy, chooses sorrow rather than a joy that
destiny had made base for her. To her lover, whom
she feels she must renounce for the sake of loyalty to
her father and her tribe, she says :
" O, all my bliss, was in our love ; but now /
I may not take it ; some deep energy
Compels me to choose hunger.
Happiness seems to her in tlie crisis of her life to
be a smaller thing :
" I can never shrink
Back into bliss,—my heart has grown too big.
With things that might be."
Will some one say. But she could not have chosen
hunger and sorrow, had she not found pleasure in
doing so, had it not on the whole made her happier
to do so, and hence was she not after all seeking her
happiness ? I simply answer. What is meant bj' pleas-
ure or happiness here ? If the meaning is simply that
this was Fedalma's free act, that so she preferred or
chose or pleased to do, then the statement is indisput-
able, since it is only saying that she could not have
chosen unless she had chosen or wished to choose.
But if "pleasure" is used in the sense of agreeable
feelings, present or remote, then to say that she acted in
anticipation of such feelings and for the sake of them
is false. As a personality in the poem, her wishes
were simply to be true, to be loyal to her tribe, and
for the sake of that she consented and even welcofned
the sorrow, hunger, and pain incidental to it. It is
.
darkening counsel with words, mere sophistication, to
say that she was actuated by the thought of pleasure
or happiness, when these only existed to her as things
to be renounced.
A man will even sacrifice his life, in those rare
emergencies where some larger interest calls. When
an engineer stays at his post in face of a collision,
knowing that he may thereby help to save other lives
though he may lose his own, has it not almost an air
of burlesque to say that he acts so as to increase the
number of his agreeable emotions, when he knows that
all emotions may soon be forever at an end with him ?
The glorious story of the Birkenhead has recently
been recited by Geru M. M. Trumbull in these col-
umns.* Certainly those men went down to their wa-
tery grave because they chose to ; it was, in this sense,
their pleasure, their happiness to. And yet the thought
of pleasure or happiness probably never crossed their
minds ; it was their duty they chose—and duty meant
almost certain death. In view of such instances it is
simply paradoxical to say that men always act with a
view to their pleasure or happiness. I may make
some remarks on the turning of this psychological
mistake into an ethical theory in a subsequent article.
MAX MULLER DENOUNCED FOR HERESY.
Prof. Max Mueller's Gifford Lectures were the
subject of acrimonious discussion in the latest monthly
meeting of the established Presbytery of Glasgow,
held on May 6, 1891. Rev. Dr. Watt who had been
moderator up to date resigned the chair and Rev. Mr.
Gillan of Carmunnock was elected in. his place. After
the discussion of sundry other business which has no
*The Open Court. Apr., p. 2759
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special interest for outsiders, the following resolution
was moved by Mr. Robert Thompson :
"Inasmuch as the teaching of Prof. Max Miiller, the Gifford
"lecturer in the University of Glasgow, is subversive of the
" Christian faith, and fitted to spread Pantheistic and infidel views
"among the students and others, and inasmuch as it is question-
"able whether the Senate has legal power to receive a bequest
'
' such as Lord Gifford's, and to appoint a lecturer to carry out
'
' the teaching of the same, the Presbytery appoint a committee
" to examine the views of the Professor as set forth in his lectures,
" and also to ascertain the Senatus's power in relation to the ac-
" ceptance of the Gifford bequest and the appointment of a lec-
" turer, and to report to a further meeting."
Schopenhauer says, it is easier to burn a heretic
than to refute his view. Since the stake has gone
out of fashion, so called heretics are pooh-poohed and
stigmatised as adversaries of Christ. Not the slight-
est attempt is made to refute Prof. Max Miiller yet
it is boldly maintained, as will be seen from the fol-
lowing report, that only he is for Christ who will de-
nounce Prof. Max Miiller's views. Mr. Thompson
should not be so rash in identifying his own opinion
with the cause of Christ. From the Christian stand-
point we maintain that a man who thinks on religious
matters as does Mr. Robert Thompson is a heathen
and against Christ. Only he is for Christ who fear-
lessly stands up for truth.
We reprint the report of the meeting without fur-
ther comments from the Glasgow Herald
:
In supporting the motion, Mr. Thompson said the university
was set up to promote the liberal arts and sciences and to teach re-
ligion within the university. There were ordained ministers of
the Church within the Senate, and they by their presence at these
lectures had been contributors toward the seducing of the students
and others who had attended to hear the most extraordinary views
propounded by the lecturer. These views were simply a rehash
of German mysticism. Pantheism, and the old argument of the in-
fidel Hume, combined with the refuse of the minds of all the pop-
ulations of the world who had gone into every error in regard to
the conception of God and the moral government of the universe,
as well as its physical development. The lecturer had, besides,
outraged Christianity by denying some of its fundamental doc-
trines—the incarnation, the resurrection, and the ascension of
Christ. Now, the Church of Scotland, he maintained, had power
through its Church Courts to overhaul the Faculty of Theology
in the university, and he asked the Presbytery to pass the resolu-
tion he had submitted. There was no anathema pronounced
against the professor. He simply asked them to appoint a com-
mittee to inquire, and he held that if they were faithful to their
ordination vows they were bound to do so. It would have been
far better if this Edinburgh lawyer had at .some time had his money
cast into the Firth of Forth than that he should by these lectures
have given an impetus to infidelity and scepticism. He had got
encouragement even within the university, for some of the pro-
fessors held views that were neither in harmony with the Confes-
sion of Faith nor with the position some of the ecclesiastics held.
A Romish priest had taken up the subject, and had spoken well
upon it. He gave him honor for what he had done. People were
saying "Where are the ministers?" and the lecturer said that he
knew many of the ministers held one thing and preached another.
Here was one of the most universal slanders ever committed
against a Christian community.
Mr. A. T. Donald seconded the motion. He believed, he
said, that these lectures had done irreparable evil to the artisans
of the community. He met the views enunciated every day in his
congregation and parish, and he believed the sooner the Presbytery
gave their voice on the subject the better. It had been left too
long. He was very proud indeed that Dr. Munro, the Roman
Catholic clergyman, had the boldness to deliver the sermons he
did. He believed those sermons touched the very foundation on
which the lecturer built up his arguments.
Dr, Watt submitted the following amendment
;
'
' That the Presbytery express profound regret that teach-
" ing of an unsettling character should be given apparently under
"the sanction of the Senatus of the university, but deem it inex-
" pedient to take any action in the matter."
The reason why he proposed this motion, he said, was that he
had received the following note from Professor Dickson, whose
absence he regretted :
"Dear Dr. Watt,—I see that the subject of the Gifford lec-
"ture occurs in the business of the Presbytery tomorrow, I
"had hoped to be present for the purpose of making a short
"statement for the information of the Presbytery as to the facts.
"But as I am disabled for the moment by a slight accident, I
"shall be glad if you will take the opportunity of submitting the
"enclosed note on the terms of Lord Gifford's will, which I drew
" up some time ago and put into the hands of Prof. Max Miiller."
That Document, Dr. AVatt continued, bore date January, 1891,
and was as follows
:
"Considerable controversy having arisen in the newspapers
over certain statements in the first two Gifford lectures of this
' session as to ' Physical Miracles ' and the belief of the clergy in
' regard to them, and calls having been made for a definition of
' what is meant by the lecturer in his use of that expression, it
' seems expedient to recall the express words in which Lord Gif-
' ford has embodied his wishes as to the treatment of the subject.
' In the deed, as prefixed to Professor Max Miiller's ' Natural Re-
' ligion ' Lord Gifford, under what he calls leading principles,
'says— ' I wish the Ircturers to treat the subject as a strictly rat
' ural science . . . without reference to, or reliance upon, any sup-
' posed special or so-called miraculous revelation.' The latter
' clause, which is the only restriction suggested by the testator, is
' couched in a peculiar form, for which it may be presumed that
' there was some special reason on the part of a Scotch lawyer or
'judge -accustomed to weigh his words. Lord Gifford was well
' aware that provision was already made in the universities— to
' which he offered his gift—for the teaching of theology as based
on revelation ; and, if he may be credited with judgment, good
' taste, and common sense, it seems hardly open to doubt that in
'desiring that the lecturers should avoid ' reference to ' as well as
'
'reliarce upon' any miraculous revelation, he wished to keep
' the handling of the subject as far as possible aloof from the risk
' of coming into collision with already existing provisions. But
' for this limitation there would have been obvious difficulties in
' the way of the universities accepting the trust. Whatever may
' have been his aim, his language as distinctly excludes reference
' to miracles as it includes reliance on them ; and the one thing
' of the nature of a restraint imposed on the lecturers is this ex-
' plicit intimation of the testator's wish, so far as that may under
' the circumstances be expected to have weight with them. If
' this view should be acted on there would be little risk of bring-
' ing one part of the teaching in the university into collision with
' another, or of having those who have been concerned in the ap-
' pointment of the lecturer, and who are of very various views,
' subjected to the imputation of responsibility for statements of
' opinion which, whatever may be their value, are essentially,
' under the circumstances, a hors i/'aiivrf."
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So far, Dr. Watt continued, he had discharged his duty to Dr.
Dickson, and he should not weary the Court by anything he had
to say. He believed he would follow the line of argument Dr.
Dickson would have taken had he been present, though for what
he said he himself was responsible. Although he felt in a some-
what curious position, he desired to offer something in the nature
of an apology for the Senatus in the peculiarly difficult circum-
stances in which they were placed. He believed it would be found
that there were many members of the Senate who were as deeply
concerned and grieved at the turn that had been taken by Prof.
Max Miiller's expressions as any member of the Presbytery. But
their position was such that they did not see how they could vin-
dicate themselves in any way that would be satisfactory to them-
selves, and to the public generally. There were certain consider-
ations that could be urged in the way of defence, if defence was
needed, of the appointment of Prof. Max Miiller as Gifford lec-
turer. The first thing that had to be taken into account was that
whether the Senatus had taken the trust or not it was certain that
a lectureship of the kind contemplated by Lord Gifford would
have been instituted, because there was an alternative body, the
Faculty of Physicians, who would have had to take charge of the
trust, and he doubted whether the public would have been better
served by lecturers appointed by them than they would be by the
Senatus of the university Then, when they considered that no
conditions could be imposed upon the lecturer, they could easily
see that in regard to the first appointment, at least, the most well
meaning men might have been led into a position which they re-
gretted. It was impossible that any fault could have been found
with the first appointment. Prof. Max Miiller was a man of very
great eminence not only in philology, but also in all branches of
modern human learning ; and surely if fault could have been found
with the appoinlment voice- would have been given to it long be-
fore the Professor began his lectures. He could easily see that,
had Professor Dickson been present, he could have founded an
argument of very considerable weight upon the paoer he (Dr.
Watt) had just read. He could have siid that Prof. Max Miiller
had a sphere of his own, while the professors of theology had their
sphere, and that it was not to be expected that he would have dealt
with such subjects as revelation and miracle, which belonged pro-
perly to another recognised part of the universiiy. He (Dr. Watt)
had no hesitation in saying that regret must be widely felt among
the members of the Senate that the lecturer in one department
should have used words which seemed to cast discredit upon the
teaching of the university in another department. This must be
felt all the more from the consideration that these lectures were
intended primarily for students, and, he believed, attended largely
by siudents and If dies. Regret must be felt that students at an
immature period cf life attended these lectures, and as responsi-
bility attached to the whole body of the Senate as the teaching
power, he thought that was something they as a Presbytery might
regret. The one difficulty in the matter was that Prof. Max Miiller
should have been appointed for a second time
—
(hear, hear) — but
there was something to be said even for that. The main argument
employed was this It was said that this was a man of eminence
who came to give a course of lectures, and that that course was
not finished. It was open to them, and no doubt that they hoped,
notwithstanding the somewhat dubious utterances he had made,
that by-and-by in the course that was to come afterwards he would
put them right. As this motion assumed, many members of the
Senate, if not the Senate as a whole, felt regret at the unfortunate
turn things had taken ; but it was certain that if they had shut off
Prof. Max Miiller's words, and said, " We will not reappoint you,"
and if the reason for doing so had been stated, the outcry against
them, on the plea that they were repressing freedom of thought,
would have been quite as strong as the outcry for giving too much
license.
Dr. John McLeod, in seconding the amendment, said he
would have preferred if the first part had been expressed in some-
what stronger terms. He was also to some extent in sympathy
with that part of Mr. Thompson's motion which would lead more
clearly to the discovery of the relations between the Presbytery
and the Senate, or such portions of the Senate as dealt with theo-
logical matters. Meantime, as a matter of form, he seconded the
amendment.
Dr. F. L. Robertson said the position he took was that the
Presbytery had no jurisdiction over the Senatus of the university.
They had no doubt authority over certain individual members
of the Senatus, but over the Senatus as a body they had no juris-
diction whatever, and they ought not to set themselves up as
judges of a Court which was quite independent of them. If the
members of the Senate were so anxious to apologise to the public
or to any other person, it was for the Senatus to make these apol-
ogies or take whatever action they pleased. Had the proposals
of Mr. Thompson and Dr. Watt been restricted to this, and in
view of the utterances which were alleged to have been made at
the university, the Presbytery should take the matter into their
consideration, that would have been an appropriate motion. But
to ask the Court to take action which would imply that they as-
sumed jurisdiction over the Senatus of the university was what
he for one was not prepared to do. The amendment he would
propose was as follows ;
" The Presbytery being advised that the Gifford Lectureship,
at present held by Prof. Max Miiller, was founded by Lord Gif-
ford in order that the origin of religion might be discussed on a
scientific basis, declare that it is out of their province to ex-
press an opinion on the wisdom of the founder in constituting
the trust, on the expediency of the university in accepting the
trust, and on the manner in which they have administered the
trust."
' Mr. Niven, in seconding, said he hoped that the expression of
the opinion that had been called forth would be a sufficient indica-
tion of the desire of the Presbytery to conserve the interests of re-
ligious truth, while at the same time they refrained from intrud-
ing into affairs where they had no legitimate or legal right to appear.
Mr. Thomson having replied, it was suggested by the Clerk
that the vote should be taken pcT capita.
Mr. Thompson—I move that the roll be called, that we may
see who is for and who is against Christ.
Dr. F. L. Robertson—I rise to order, and ask that Mr.
Thompson should withdraw that expression. (Hear, hear.)
The Moderator asked Mr. Thompson to withdraw the expres-
sion, but he declined.
Dr. Robertsoo—I insist on it being withdrawn. Neither Mr.
Thompson nor any member of the Court has any right to affirm
that any man who moves an amendment, or who is prepared to
support it, denies Christ.
,
Mr. Thomson—I say those who prefer the motion are, in
my opinion, for Christ. It is an expression of opinion.
The Moderator— Will you authorise me to ask Mr. Thompson
to withdraw that expression in regard to any member of the Court ?
Mr. Thomson—I say those who prefer the motion
The Moderator—You do not gain anything by the course you
are adopting
Mr. Thomson—I say I look upon it in the light I have stated.
The Moderator— Is that a modification ?
Dr. Robertson—It is not. I move that he be requested to
withdraw the expression.
Mr. Thomson—In case it should influence any of your votes
I withdraw. I have sharp eyes, and I can see who are for and
who are against. In case somebody should tell me he changed
because I held to what I said, I withdraw. " I should not do it
otherwise.
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The Moderator—Do you withdraw ?
Mr. Thomson—Yes, of course.
The two amendments were then put to the meeting, when
thirteen voted for Dr. Robertson's and seven for that of Dr. Watt.
In the second vote Dr. Robertson's amendment was put against
the motion, and carried by seventeen to five votes. On the result
the division being announced,
Mr. Thomson exclaimed—Five for Christ !
The Moderator— I do not think that is in order. I do not
think Mr. Thomson has a right to say of any member that he is
not for Christ.
Mr. Thomson—I said they were for Christ. I did not say
they were not for Christ.
The Moderator—The implication was rather strong.
Mr. Nivan— I am sorry that Mr. Thomson has recurred to
this matter again. I feel that it is inconsistent with the character
of a Church Court that observations like that should be allowed to
pass unnoticed. I think that Mr. Thomson should be again called
upon to withdraw the observation that he has made.
Mr. Thomson—I said five are for Christ, but I might have
said more—that they are for the Church of Scotland.
The Moderator—You have heard again that you are requested
to withdraw your insinuation against members of this Court.
Mr. Thomson—I do riot withdraw. I made no insinuation.
The Moderator.—Do you state explicitly that there is no insin-
nation ?
Mr. Thomson—I said decidedly that five are for Christ You
can ask me to explain.
Dr. Watt—Mr. Thomson ought clearly to understand that the
Presbytery, having taken' this view that he should be requested to
withdraw, may adopt a certain course of conduct. If Mr. Thom-
son refuses we must punish him in some way.
Mr.' Thomson—You will be punished for your heresies
Dr. Watt—The forms and laws of the Church do not provide
us with any method of punishment, because those who laid down
the rules of procedure could never for a moment have supposed
that such words ard expressions, contrary to good feeling, could
ever be spoken or allowed in any Church Court. I say this, be-
cause as your Moderator I felt myself in a difficulty if I should be
pushed into this corner. I feel extremely for you, sir, on this the
first day on which you have taken the chair, that you should be
placed in this most unfortunate position. I should like Mr. Thom-
son to know that we can at least pass a resolution in which we ex-
press our sense of grievous displeasure and our censure. If a man
does not feel that, I do not know what he can feel. That would
be his punishment. I am not making a motion, but letting Mr.
Thomson know that that is the only alternative before the Presby-
tery.
Dr. John Macleod— In the observations I made with reference
to Dr. Watt's motion I was at pains to say thnt I sympathised to
a very large extent with the motives which animated Mr. Thomson
in so far as they led him to challenge the teaching which has been
lately delivered in the university. I refrained from comniitting
myself to his motion, however, because I felt it went prematurely
into a matter with which it was not expedient for the Court to
deal. In these circumstances I am entitled more than anyone to
ask that he should withdraw the expression. Mr. Thomson must
be certain that many of us who have not seen it to be our duty to
support his motion are as profoundly indignant at any teaching
that wouild tamper with the great verities of the Christian faith as
he can be. If it could be supposed for a single moment that the
Senate of the university or any part of it were in sympathy with
such teaching, I should be the first to take action and to propose
t hat the Church sever its connection with the university altogether,
so deeply do I feel on the subject. I hope, therefore, that Mr.
Thomson will see it to be his duty to withdraw the expression and
not put us in the position of being sympathisers with the teaching
he has condemned.
The Moderator— I think after that appeal you should with-
draw.
Mr. Thomson—That relieves me a great deal. I said that
five are for Christ and the Church of Scotland. I hold that we
are all that. I do not mean to particularise and say who is not
for Christ.
The amendment was then adopted.
The meeting afterwards separated.
THE SUNSET CLUB ON THE JURY SYSTEM.
At the last banquet of the Sunset Club, one hundred and
ninety-one members were present, and the subject for considera-
tion was "Our jury system, can it be improved ?" In addition to
the two leading speakers, fifteen others took part in the debate,
and they were nearly all alike in opinion that "Our Jury System "
is a very bad one, and that it ought to be improVed. They were
not harmoni-ous in their plans for improving it, because many of
them seemed to have only a superficial knowledge of the genius
and moral constitution of Trial by Jury, and its importance as a
sanctuary for liberty when personal rights are assailed by the con-
spiracies of government. They saw Trial by Jury corrupted in
the interest of wrong, and they charged upon the system itself the
very adulterations which it has always resisted until defeated by
force or fraud.
The banquet being ended, and the requisite aroma given to
the subject by the incense of cigars, the chairman called upon Mr.
Sigmund Zeisler to open the debate. He did it very well, but un-
fortunately, at the very beginning of his argument, he led the
company astray by criticising, not the jury system, but those very
sensible persons who manage to keep out of the jury box. His
budget of reforms went up in smoke when he said that "no
amount of legislation will radically improve our jury system so
long as citizens shirk jury duty." This admission blocked the
road, because it is morally certain that until the jury system as
operated in Chicago is reformed, citizens whose time is worth any-
thing will continue to "shirk" jury service. That service is no
longer a public duty ; it has become a persecution which it is our
domestic duty to escape from if we can. Mr. Zeisler himself com-
plained that at one trial in Chicago, seven weeks were consumed
in the selection of a jury ; and of course the jurors chosen early
were compelled to wait week after week for the others. After
that, several weeks more were consumed in the trial, which con-
sisted of ten parts testimony and ninety parts objections to its in-
troduction. A man's duty to his family commands him to avoid
serving as a juryman at such a trial.
Most men will agree with Mr. Zeisler that the number of
"challenges for cause" ought to be reduced, and especially those
founded on opinions formed or expressed. It is a dismal thing to
see a lawyer of great mental incapacity fishing in the dried up
river bed of a man's past lifetime, with a hook baited with frivol-
ous questions, hoping to get a nibble to which he may call the at-
tention of the judge as a sign which when corroborated by twenty
other signs which he expects to get may justify a "challenge for
cause." It is not so certain, however, that the business of exam-
ining jurymen as to their qualifications should as Mr. Zeisler
claims, " be taken from counsel, and given to the presiding judge."
There are grave objections to that plan.
It would be travelling backwards to deprive a prisoner or his
counsel of the right to ask a witness or a juryman any question
that may be properly put. Eye to eye, and voice to ear, emphasise
every question, and they help the test of cross examination. It is
the right of every man to use their potent influence to aid him in
revealing truth or exposing falsehood. Nor ought it to be the law
that only second hand questions be put to a juryman concerning
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his qualifications, roundabout from the counsel to the judge, and
then from the judge to the juryman. This is the practice at courts
martial, and it is of doubtful wisdom there. A prisoner is often
at a disadvantage because he is not permitted to examine or cross-
examine a witness, but must filter all his questions through the
Judge Advocate. A similar practice would be a novelty in our
courts, but hardly a reform.
He did not mean to do it perhaps, but Mr. Zeisler stuck some
red hot pins into the consciences of his congregation when he de-
nounced the practice of summoning talesmen by special venire as
" vicious in itself and a powerful aid to those who practice the art
of jury packing"; for he knew that a jury packed in that "vi-
cious " manner by special orders, had sentenced American citizens
to death with the approval of nearly all the men he was talking to.
Is it according to etiquette thus to raise ghosts at a festive board ?
Mr. Zeisler's chief objections were brought against that prin-
ciple of trial by jury which requires that the verdict shall be
unanimous ; and here he made a plausible and business like argu-
ment in favor of a verdict by a majority of two thirds. He was
not entirely consistent in his reasons, and the success of his plead-
ing was largely due to the fact that he left out of it the political
character of trial by jury, and treated that venerable institution
as merely a practical method by which issues of fact may be de-
cided. This indeed is the exterior form of it, but its inner spirit
is now and always was that not only shall the facts be found, but
also that twelve impartial men chosen from the body of the county
shall approve the legal consequences which the judges aver must
follow. Trial by jury has always held in reserve supreme author-
ity over the final issue Guilty, or Not guily, and within the heart
of it as within a citadel the Anglo Saxon race for fifteen hundred
years has preserved "the higher law."
Coming down to instances, Mr. Zeisler brought up the Cronin
case to show how the rule of unanimity almost defeated the law of
punishment. Had the one dissenting juror in that case held out
for an acquittal instead of a compromise, it would have necessitated
a new trial ; and that, said Mr. Zeisler, "would have meant the
eventual escape from all punishment of the perpetrators of a bru-
tal murder." In this warning and complaint Mr. Zeisler was in-
consistent with himself, because a little farther on he said that "in
capital cases the death penalty should not be inflicted unless the
jury should unanimously agree upon a verdict of guilty." Why
not ? If they're/' of guilt can be legally established by two thirds
of a jury why should not the vindication follow ? By this conces-
sion to the principle of unanimity Mr. Zeisler weakened his case
and strengthened the other side, because if a verdict by less than
twelve ought not to carry with it the death penalty, it must be for
the reason that the verdict itself is doubtful as a finding of the
fact. And a verdict which is to doubtful to hang a man ought not
to be sufficiently true to imprison him for life.
General Stiles, the appointed leader of the other side, brought
his battalions on to the field in good order, but they came to rein-
force the arguments of Mr. Zeisler, and gave him victory. Gen-
eral Stiles agreed with him throughout, and even went beyond
him, for he said: "It is an important question whether at the
proper time we could not afford to dispense with the jury system
altogether. There are a great many objections to it " He was
not prepared, however, to advocate the immediate abolition of the
jury system. " We must grow up to that," he said. " Like many
other things, that is a condition that must be evolved, not created."
The practical objection to this argument is that it will apply to
any change proposed by anybody ; "at some future stage in the
progress of social and political evolution, " says the reformer, ' ' the
change may be safely made, but—but—but, not now."
The general discussion that followed lacked originality, and
the men who took part in it seemed like a lot of stragglers in the
rear of the column trying to keep up with the main body com-
manded by Mr. Zeisler and General Stiles. They kept on firing
at the malingerers who hide when the detail comes for them to
serve upon the jury ; and one enthusiastic veteran proposed to
expel from the Sunset club all shirkers of jury duty. The propo-
sition was not entertained, because if adopted it would have been
fatal to the club. That same enthusiast also conjured up the ' 'jury
briber," and proposed to " take him out and hang him." There is
always among those after-dinner orators an amiable gentleman pre-
tending to be a man of sanguinary purpose, who sentences to rhe-
torical death any trivial delinquent whom his imagination, acting
as a moral policeman, seizes and brings before him for judgment.
The jury briber having been marched off to summary execu-
tion, the debate went on. Some of the members advocated pro-
fessional jurors, elected for a term of years and paid good salaries.
Others thought that a jury commission should be appointed with
power to revise the jury lists, and present the names of men from
whom the jury should be drawn. One member said : " The root
of the evil is that litigants and their lawyers are not honest."
Noticing a good many lawyers present, he thought that he ought
to modify his accusation, and he did so by offering for the lawyers
an excuse which rather strengthened the original charge. With
amusing simplicity he said, "lam not preaching that lawyers
must be honest, for if they are, Ihcy lose their cast:."
Nearly all the proposed changes had merit in them, and per-
haps any of them if adopted would be an improvement on the jury
system as administered in Chicago and other cities now ; but when
compared with a trial by a jury of twelve good and lawful men
impartial in themselves, and impartially drawn by lot from all the
qualified voters of the county it is not likely that any of them would
be better than the original system, except perhaps in civil causes
and in criminal cases below the grade of felony; and it is not at
all certain that they would be an improvement even there. What
is needed is the i-LStdnitioii of trial by jury, not its mutilation, nor
the substitution of some other system for it.
The moral qualities and the political importance of trial by
jury were presented for consideration by two members of the club,
but they came too late upon the field. It was near the end of the
debate when Mr. Gregory said : "No lawyer who has studied the
history of his profession can but be moved by the accounts of the
great battles for freedom which have characterised its growth and
development, and in which trial by jury has borne so conspicuous
a part." And it was even later when Mr. Hatch condensing a
very strong argument into a very few words, said: "The jury
system is not merely a means for the administration of justice
between parties, it is a political institution It stands between
the people and arbitrary government, whether it comes through
the government itself, or by powerful lords, as in the early history
of England, or as to- day in the encroachments of powerful trusts
and corporations. The civil liberties of the people will be safe so
long as the administration of justice is taken part in by juries
selected by the county at large."
If Mr. Hatch and Mr. Gregory had spoken earlier, the de-
bate would have been forced on to the higher plane of historical
comparison, and the patriotic services of trial by jury would have
been considered. Besides discussing the most expedient way of
getting verdicts, this larger question must have been debated. Has
individual freedom become so firmly established in this country
that we do not need any longer the political protection of trial by
jury ? Considering the enormous wealth of the American Pluto-
cracy, the Imperial prerogatives claimed and exercised by the
Legislative and Executive powers in the American republic, and
the disposition to increase them at the expense of popular liberty,
it may be well for us to pause before we weaken by one-third the
old safeguard which curbed the Norman barons and conquered
the English kings, a jury of twelve impartial men, unanimous in
their verdict. M. M. Trumbull.
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THE PROGRESS OF RELIGION.
The Christian Union of May 7th says concerning a discussion
which of late took place between Professor Briggs and his an-
tagonist, concerning the "whither" of his unorthodox theology;
" There is every reason to believe that we are at the beginning of
one of the most fundamental theological discussions of the cen-
tury, for the question of the sources and authority of the Bible
goes to the root of the Christian religion. That this discussion was
certain to come has long been evident to all those who have been
familiar with critical work on the Old Testament ; that it ought to
come has long been the conviction of those who hold that the
world is entitled to every particle of light, and that to know the
truth is the only security. The Christian Union deprecates quite
as strongly as any of those who oppose opening this question the
waste of time and strength in abstract theological discussion, but
this discussion involves a very different question than one of forms
or statements. It can no more be postponed than can the move-
ment of the human mind searching for truth and compelled to
modify its conclusions by truth. The Christian Church is bound
to welcome truth from whatever quarter it comes ; if it believes in
the truth which it possesses, it will be absolutely fearless ; instead
of shunning discussion and investigation, it will court the clearest
and most searching e.xamination of all the foundations of its
faith. What it holds essentially are a few great historic facts
which answer to the few great human needs and which solve the
few great hnman problems. The life of the Church is not bound
up in any theology or philosophy
; it is not identified with any
explanation of these facts. The facts belong to the Church
ecumenical and universal ; the explanations belong to the Church
provincial. The Church provincial has often been disturbed
and compelled to modify its positions ; the Church universal,
holding to the essential facts of Christianity, has never been
shaken and never will be. There has been no more disastrous
blunder than the attempt to fight against any form of new truth
on the part of religious people. The .Church ought never to have
been arrayed against any form of scientific investigation ; and yet
it has steadfastly, through the mouths of many of its leading teach-
ers, fought every inch of ground over which science has passed,
and been driven, step by step, backward from its positions, only
to discover at length that it had been holding ground that never
belonged to it and opposing that which was best for it. For it will
be seen in the long run that the greatest ally of religion in this
century has been science, correcting false ideas, cutting off specu-
lative excrescences, simplifying, broadening, and making still more
majestic the general conception of the universe. Since this dis-
cussion was certain to come, it ought to come inside the Church
and not outside it. The researches of Biblical scholars in the last
hundred years have created a new province of scholarship ; they
have collected a vast mass of materials bearing upon many of the
books of the Old Testament and raising many questions with re-
gard to their dates and authorship. The material is in the pos-
session of a host of scholars. What the scholars know the world
will know, sooner or later, for all the conclusions of scholarship
are certain, eventually, to become common property. It is simply
a question, in this case, whether these great subjects shall be dis-
cussed and these great issues settled by devout, reverential schol-
ars inside the Chuich, or whether the conclusions shall be reached
by men without religious feeling or interests, but in possession of
the fads
;
it is a question whether the revision of the attitude of
the Church on these matters shall be made by its friends or forced
upon it by its enemies. The issue which has been precipitated by
the outspoken frankness of Professor Briggs ought to have been
raised years ago. The Church owes a debt of gratitude to Pro-
fessor Briggs because he has had the courage to raise this question
frankly and in all its fullness inside Church lines. He does not
stand alone
;
there are many other Christian teachers and scholars
who, without agreeing with him in every respect, hold to his gen
eral view and aie at one with him in believing that the time has
come for discussion and action. In such a discussion as this there
are manifold temptations to heat, unfairness, and precipitation.
All these things are to be deprecated and avoided. Professor
Briggs has already been widely misrepresented. For his sake, and
for the sake of all those who are to take part in this discussion, we
warn our readers in no case to make up their opinion until they
know that they fully understand the position of the man they are
judging."
This article is a good sign of the times. It proves that the
harvest is near at hand and that a great reformation is preparing
itself. Whether this reformation is to take place in the Presby-
terian Church, of which Professor Briggs is a member, would
however seem to be doubtful. The General Assembly at Detroit
last week vetoed his appointment to the chair of Biblical Theology
in Union Seminary. The grave question of heresy still remains
to be decided by the New York Presbytery.
BOOK REVIEWS.
Easy Lessons on the Constitution of the United States.
By Alfred Bayless. Chicago : W. W. Knowles & Co.
This is an excellent school book, and it will be of great as-
sistance to students of the American Constitution. Some big boys
too who think themselves lawyers might study it with a good
deal of profit. It is an easy explanation in detail of the several
Articles and Sections of the Constitution, a subject of study gen-
erally supposed to be extremely difficult to everybody excepting
persons "learned in the law."
Some of the author's comments and explanations refer to
parts of our political system outside the Constitution, but the
separation is not clearly made, as for instance in passages like
this : " The senate committees are appointed by the senate itself,
but the house committees are appointed by the speaker." This
immediately follows an explanation of the Sections of the Con-
stitution which refer to the Speaker of the House and the Presi-
dent of the Senate, and without some explanation might be mis-
taken for parts of the Constitution. So also, such a statement as
this, "Every member of Congress is addressed as Honorable."
This also might be supposed from the context to be a mandate of
the Constitution ; but these are trifles of small moment in com-
parison with the merits of the book.
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